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ABSTRACT
ORACLE GUIDED INCREMENTAL SAT SOLVING TO
REVERSE ENGINEER CAMOUFLAGED CIRCUITS
SEPTEMBER 2017
XIANGYU ZHANG
B.Sc., FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Daniel Holcomb
This study comprises two tasks. The first is to implement gate-level circuit
camouflage techniques. The second is to implement the Oracle-guided incremental
de-camouflage algorithm and apply it to the camouflaged designs.
The circuit camouflage algorithms are implemented in Python, and the Oracle-
guided incremental de-camouflage algorithm is implemented in C++. During this
study, I evaluate the Oracle-guided de-camouflage tool (Solver, in short) performance
by de-obfuscating the ISCAS-85 combinational benchmarks, which are camouflaged
by the camouflage algorithms. The results show that Solver is able to efficiently
de-obfuscate the ISCAS-85 benchmarks regardless of camouflaging style, and is able
to do so 10.5x faster than the best existing approaches. And, based on Solver, this
study also measures the de-obfuscation runtime for each camouflage style.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
IC designers have clear incentives against publicizing all implementation details of a
design, as this may compromise their strategic advantage or leak sensitive information.
However, once a circuit is fabricated and released to market, reverse engineering
techniques can attempt to extract implementation details from the physical object
without consent or knowledge of the designer. Circuit camouflaging is an attempt to
obscure the true functionality of a circuit, and to limit the information that can be
leaked through reverse engineering.
Gate-level camouflaging is a particular camouflaging technique in which the func-
tions of certain combinational logic gates cannot be directly ascertained from imaging-
based reverse engineering. In this case, the logic may be inferred using a combination
of information obtained from reverse engineering and information obtained through
observation of input-output vectors captured through scan chains or other mechanisms.
In my work I present such an algorithm for extracting the functionality of reverse
engineered netlists.
The specific contributions of this work are as follows:
• I present an incremental-SAT-based technique for reverse engineering camou-
flaged integrated circuits that outperforms its non-incremental counterpart by
10.5x in terms of average runtime on ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
• I show that selective gate camouflaging based on the objective of maximizing
output corruption [27] offers no resistance to reverse engineering and can reduce
the number of vectors required to deobfuscate a circuit.
1
• I provide a new standard and widely-applicable tool for logic de-obfuscation that
can be used to evaluate current and future approaches for selective camouflaging.1
• I demonstrate that our technique is general and can efficiently resolve the
obfuscated function of three proposed camouflaging techniques [27, 23, 4].
1The source code of our tool and benchmarks used in this work are released publicly at our project
website at
https://ycunxi.github.io/Incremental-SAT-DeCam/.
2
CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
By decapsulating chips, and removing layers and imaging in succession to reveal
the internal information, invasive techniques can be used by a reverse engineer to steal
gate-level circuit functions. Recently, such reverse engineering of integrated circuit
(IC) chips has caused loss for the IC industry [32]. Torrance and James [32] gave an
overview of the state of the art in invasive reverse engineering.
Recent years, people focus on extracting high-level meaning from the deluge of
gates by invasive reverse engineering of fabricated circuits. Through matching against
known components, Li managed to resolve subcircuit components and obtain word-
level structures [20]. Subramanyan also improves to operate on the unstructured
netlist, where subcircuits are not identified in advance [30]. Work by Gasco´n [10]
managed to check equivalence between a circuit-under-investigation and a reference
circuit when the signal correspondence between the two is unknown. Different from
the above mentioned methods, there is no complete gate-level model of the circuit-
under-investigation.
Camouflaged gates is a countermeasure against image-based reverse engineering.
Camouflaged gates can provide the same looking cells while the logic functions or
connections are substantially different. In such way, a circuit’s function cannot be
inferred from its appearance. Camouflaged gate libraries [31] can be realized by
using hard-to-observe structural techniques to create different gate functions [6], or
functionality can be controlled without structural differences by changing doping of
specific devices [1, 28, 23, 12]. To minimize cost, one may choose to only camouflage
3
a small portion of the circuits [3, 27]. However, without the knowledge of the actual
circuit, a reverse engineer needs to consider all gates are camouflaged [2]. Vijayakumar
provides an overview of physical mechanisms for obfuscation [33].
Rajendran al. gives an attacker model for reverse engineering circuits with camou-
flaged gates [26]. When the attacker knows all non-camouflaged gates and can apply
input and get output, the camouflaged circuit remain hard to discover. My work
uses oracle-guided synthesis [13], but the capability and limitation of this technique
need attention. Though the overall circuit produced by oracle-guided synthesis is
guaranteed to be functionally equivalent to the obfuscated circuit, it is not guaranteed
to have equivalence gate by gate. For example, given that 2-input XOR and 2-input
NAND gates produce different outputs only for the 00 input combination, the two
gate functions are interchangeable if the 00 input combination cannot be justified
or propagated to the outputs. This gate-level ambiguity is unavoidable if trying to
synthesize a design based on merely inputs and outputs, but it is important to note
that a design recovered through oracle-guided synthesis should not be used for certain
classes of side-channel attacks or fault injection attacks that require knowing the states
of all combinational circuit nets.
During my work, I modeled all the three mainstream camouflage techniques by
a logic model based on multiplexer, but the problem of logic locking arise. Logic
locking is closely related to the problem of camouflaging and in logic locking, recent
works show the importance of trying to thwart SAT attacks by ensuring that each
input-output example provides limited information about the values of the key bits
that unlock the circuit [36] [34]. In an extreme case, one can guarantee that an
exponential number of input-output examples are needed to exactly learn the key
bits, but a consequence of this is that output corruption under incorrect key guesses
will be limited [36]. A similar approach has been used with camouflaging to quantify
the security of the camouflaged circuits [37] [19]. Note that in logic locking, care
4
must be taken to ensure that the key gates cannot be identified and removed, and
thus to remain secure under reverse engineering logic locking can be combined with
obfuscation [36] [15].
Reverse engineering could be viewed as a form of privacy threat with respect to
the IP implemented on a chip. In a related reverse engineering context, privacy of
specific chip instances can be violated by an ability to observe unintended unique
features of each device instance [14, 25].
5
CHAPTER 3
CIRCUIT CAMOUFLAGE AND ATTACKER MODEL
The attacker model in my work is that of an attacker have instances of a chip and
want to reconstruct the logic function of the whole chip. Based on prior works and
the attacker model proposed by Rajendran [27], the assumption of the capability of
the attacker is as follows:
1. By imaging the layers, an attacker can obtain the information of the logic
functions and the topology of the circuit. Namely, the attacker can generate a
netlist from such instances of a chip.
2. The attacker can identify which components are camouflaged, which is because
the camouflaged parts do not look identical to the non-camouflaged parts. For
example, a camouflaged gate that can be configured to a number of different
possible functions is usually larger than the function-specific implementation of
the same gates.
3. The attacker can apply input to the camouflaged combinational circuit and
observe the output signals. Because attacker has access to an instance of chips,
this could be achieved by using scan-based test techniques [35], possibly combined
with micro probing to gain access to deactivated scan chains [17].
In this work, I model all the configurations of the camouflaged circuit using
multiplexers with uncertain control bits, because an uncertainty of connection and
functionality can be translated to uncertainty about the value of certain Boolean
variables . In Chapter 4, I show how to solve for the value of these variables using
6
SAT. The resolved value can thus indicate the actual logic function or connection
of the camouflaged gate. In this chapter, I will explain the principle of the three
different types of camouflaged components: Camouflaged Standard Cells, Obfusgates,
and Transformable Interconnects, as well as how to apply this modeling mechanism.
pi   pi+1
A
B
Y
A
B
Y
pi    pi+1   pi+2   pi+3
A
B
(a) NAND/NOR/XOR Camouflage
pi   pi+1
A
B
Y
A
B
Y
pi    pi+1   pi+2   i+3
A
B
(b) Fully Camouflaged
Figure 3.1: Circuit constructs used to model Camouflaged Standard Cells. Boolean variables pi
configure the logic function of the gate, and an attacker tries to learn the value of these variables.
3.1 Camouflaged Standard Cells using Dummy Contacts
The principle of standard cell camouflaging is using a generic cell layout to
realize multiple logic functions. Through some invisible changes to this layout, the
functionality can be substantially changed while attacker cannot notice those changes
from an imaging-based attack. One way to implement hard-to-observe changes is to
use Dummy Contacts [5]. Dummy contacts are structures that look like connections
between metal layers, or connections between metal layers and polysilicon, but there is
no such connection. A same-looking cell can be configured to different logic functions
depending on which contacts in a cell are true contacts. According to [5], Dummy
Contacts can not be found by imaging-based technique, so a reverse engineer cannot
know which logic function is implemented by the cell.
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A specific variant of a camouflaged standard cell is a generic cell layout that can
realize the functionality of 2-input XOR, NAND, or NOR gates depending on which
contacts are true [27]. To model the camouflaged cell, I introduce a multiplexer-based
model (Figure 3.1). The functionality can be derived by resolving the values of program
bits pi, pi+1 (Figure 3.1 a). Note that in this model pi, pi+1 are forbidden to be ”11” since
there are only three possible functions for the gate. Additionally, I extend the model
(Figure 3.1 b) to gain the capability of modeling other types of camouflaged standard
cells. The function of Y can be represented as Y = A¯B¯p1+A¯Bp2+AB¯p3+ABp4.
Hence, this model is able to represent any of the sixteen possible two-input functions.
3.2 Obfusgates: Dopant Programmable Logic Cells
Similar to the principle of camouflaged standard cell, Malik et al. [23] proposed
another indistinguishable component, which is Obfusgates. An Obfusgate is imple-
mented by combining a standard cell logic gate with some Obfuscells connected to
its input and output ports. Malik demonstrates Obfusgates based on both NAND4
and AND2 [23], but here I consider only the NAND4 variant. Depending on the
dopant polarity within the active area of the Obfuscell, each Obfuscell can have four
logic functions: inverter, buffer, constant 1, or constant 0. Because imaging-based
technique can not see the dopant polarity, attackers will have difficulty learning the
logical function of the Obfusgate [23].
Unlike camouflaged standard cells that can only provide functionality obfuscation,
Obfusgates can provide both functionality and connection obfuscation. The func-
tionality obfuscation is based on the different configuration of Obfuscell. And the
connection obfuscation relies on the fact that pins connected to the constant 0 and
constant 1 inputs can provide additional dummy wire, which can be connected to any
sources without impacting the logic function of the circuit.
8
OBF-CELL
OBF-CELL
OBF-CELL
i1
i2
i3
1
0
p
i+1pi
Y
YOBF-CELL
OBF-CELLi4
NAND
Figure 3.2: Schematic of a single Obfusgate that consists of 5 Obfuscells together with a 4-input
NAND gate. This gate can have 162 different logic functions depending on the logical functions
realized by each Obfuscell.
Figure 3.2 shows an Obfusgate comprising a NAND4 gate and five Obfuscells.
Because an Obfuscell potentially has four different functions, I use a 4-to-1 multiplexer
to model an Obfuscell and apply constant 0, constant 1, buffer and inverter to the
multiplexer (Figure 3.2). The function of the camouflaged circuit can be resolved
by finding appropriate values for the programming bits of the Obfuscells. For each
NAND4-based Obfusgate, with five Obfuscells each having four possible functions,
there are 45 total configurations possible. Many of these 45 configurations cause
the Obfusgate to realize the same functions, and there are 162 unique 4-input logic
functions that can be created by the NAND4 Obfusgate.
3.3 Transformable Interconnects
Different from the previous discussed two techniques, the principle of transformable
interconnects is to provide connection obfuscation, which is proposed by Chen et al [4].
The implementation of this method is using two types of contacts in interconnection:
magnesium (Mg) contacts which are conductors, and magnesium oxide (MgO) contacts
9
which are not conductors. During delaying, the Mg contacts will oxidize into MgO, so
the attacker cannot distinguish which contacts were Mg.
An example of camouflaging using transformable interconnect is shown in Figure 3.3.
The reverse engineer’s view of the circuit is as shown in Fig. 3.3(a), and from this
he will infer that d1, d2, and d3 cannot all be true wires. The configurations in
Fig. 3.3(b), 3.3(c) and 3.3(d) represent the set of hypotheses for the true connectivity
of the circuit. Each one of these would represent the circuit functionality under a
single guess about which wire was a non-conducting dummy. The reverse engineer
therefore models the transformable interconnect component as shown in Fig. 3.3(e),
where the values of p0 and p1 select the true connectivity of the circuit. Now, just as
in the previous components, the reverse engineer can use input-output examples from
the circuit to infer the values of p0 and p1 and hence resolve the function of the circuit.
10
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Figure 3.3: (a) Design as viewed by reverse engineers; (b, c, d) three valid circuit configurations
when d1 or d2 or d3 is transformable interconnect; (e) attacker model of transformable interconnect.
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CHAPTER 4
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Algorithm 1 Incremental SAT-based Deobfuscation: Incrementally generate a set of
constraints that are sufficient to identify the correct model of the circuit, and then
solve the constraints to find the model.
1: M(I, P, P ′)← ckt(I, P,O) ∧ ckt(I, P ′, O′) ∧O 6= O′ // see Fig. 4.1
2: feas(P )← > // all programming vectors are feasible initially, unless the model itself
imposes constraints
3: feas(P ′)← >
4: for j = 1, 2, 3 . . . do
5: // number of satisfying assignments to feas(P ) is the number of programming vectors that
remain feasible
6: if ∃I, P, P ′.
I distinguishes P and P ′︷ ︸︸ ︷
M(I, P, P ′) ∧
P and P ′ both feasible︷ ︸︸ ︷
feas(P ) ∧ feas(P ′) then
7: Îj ← I
8: Ôj ← QueryOracle(Îj) // (Îj , Ôj) is the jth I/O pair discovered
9: feas(P ) ← feas(P ) ∧ ckt(Îj , P, Ôj) // strengthen feasibility constraint on P
using new I/O pair
10: feas(P ′)← feas(P ′) ∧ ckt(Îj , P ′, Ôj) // strengthen feasibility constraint on P ′
using new I/O pair
11: else
12: ∃P.feas(P ) // Find a single feasible programming assignment P
13: return P
14: end if
15: end for
From the previous chapter, I use multiplexer-based component to model the three
techniques (see Figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). I now present a de-obfuscation algorithm to
solve for the programming vector assignment that can configure the logic function
of the model to be the same as the oracle circuit. The programming vector can
thus reveal the actual connection and functionality of the camouflaged circuit. This
algorithm is based on a series of input-output pairing; these pairs constrain which
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programming vector values are feasible. A feasible programming vector is one that
induces a circuit function that does not contradict any known input-output pairings.
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
Feas(P ')
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
Feas(P)
Iˆ2
Iˆ1
P
Oˆ1
P '
ckt
ckt
ckt
Iˆ0 Oˆ0
Oˆ2ckt
ckt
I
O
O '
…
…Iˆ2
Iˆ1 Oˆ1
ckt
ckt
Iˆ0 Oˆ0
Oˆ2ckt
≠? 1
Figure 4.1: The unshaded components comprise a miter used to find conditions where two copies of
the circuit produce different outputs due to different programming vectors. The shaded components
enforce feasibility constraints that restrict programming vectors to be consistent with input-output
examples.
4.1 Defining Notation
• Vector I = {i0, . . . , im−1} represents an m-bit primary input vector to the circuit.
• Vector P = {p0, p1, . . .} represents a programming vector that specifies the
logic function implemented by each camouflaged component in the circuit. The
length of the programming vector depends on the number of camouflaged circuit
elements and the number of possible realizations for each element. The value of
P together with the non-camouflaged circuit components together fully specify
the logical function of the overall circuit. A programming vector is denoted
as feasible if the logic function it induces does not contradict a set of known
input-output examples. Learning new input-output examples incrementally
constrains feasible values of the programming vector P .
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• Vector O = {o0, . . . , on−1} represents an n-bit primary output vector.
• The combinational circuit model, including all multiplexers and programming
bits, is converted into a CNF formula ckt using Tseitin encoding. I use
ckt(I, P,O) to denote the CNF formula of the circuit when I, P , and O are the
input variables, programming bits, and output variables respectively. Wherever
ckt(I, P,O) appears in Alg. 1 (at lines 1, 9, and 10), it always refers to a fresh
copy of the circuit CNF with new variables for all internal circuit nodes. If two
copies of the circuit CNF share a common input vector or programming vector,
the respective inputs or programming vectors are equated to each other outside
of the CNF of the combinational circuit.
• Subformula M(I, P, P ′) in Alg. 1 (line 1) represents the CNF-encoded miter of
two copies of the circuit, as shown by the unshaded blocks in Fig. 4.1. This
formula is satisfiable if and only if there exists an input I, and programming
vectors P and P ′ that cause the circuit to map I to different output values.
Restated, M(I, P, P ′) is satisfiable if some P and P ′ cause the circuit to realize
different logic functions. If M(I, P, P ′) is unsatisfiable, then it means that all
P and P ′ cause the circuit to realize the same logic function. On its own,
this formula would typically be easily satisfiable and not meaningful, but it
becomes useful when combined with additional feasibility constraints on P and
P ′. In that scenario, the formula M(I, P, P ′) is used for checking whether the
constraints can be satisfied by two different realizable logic functions, or whether
the constraints are strong enough that only a single realizable logic function
satisfies them.
• Subformulas feas(P ) and feas(P ′) denote the feasibility constraints applied to
programming vectors P and P ′ respectively. These formulas are identical except
for being applied to different copies of the programming vector. The formulas
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evaluate to true only for the subset of programming vectors that are consistent
with a set of input-output pairings obtained from the oracle. These feasibility
constraints are CNF-encodings of the shaded blocks in Fig. 4.1.
The goal of the attacker is to recover the function of the obfuscated circuit by
finding a value of P that induces his model to realize the same function as the oracle.
Two functions are equivalent if they produce the same outputs for all possible inputs,
but equivalence is usually checked symbolically instead of by exhaustively applying
inputs. However, symbolic equivalence checking cannot be applied between a model
and a black-box oracle, so SAT-based reverse engineering relies on an oracle-guided
synthesis approach, as described in the remainder of this paragraph. Given that there
are programming vectors to select all possible functions of all camouflaged components,
there necessarily exists one or more values of P that will cause the model to realize the
same function as the oracle. Because the attacker knows that there must exist such a
value of P , he can find it by ruling out values of P using input-output examples from
the oracle until only a single function remains. At this point, the one function that is
not ruled out is known to be equivalent to the oracle by the process of elimination.
Any value of P that induces the model to have this function is a solution to the
deobfuscation problem.
4.2 SAT Solving of Camouflaged Circuit
Boolean satisfiability solving is a common way to reason circuit logic, and it is used
widely in automated test pattern generation (ATPG) [18]. Using Tseitin encoding, a
gate-by-gate translation can map the circuit logic into a (CNF)-encoded SAT problem.
The number of variables in the CNF problem is equal to the number of nodes in the
circuit, and the number of clauses in the CNF problem is linear in the number of
circuit logic gates. If a CNF problem is satisfiable, a SAT solver can find an assignment
of 0 or 1 to each variable such that the CNF problem is equal to 1.
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The difference between ATPG and the de-obfuscation problem is that obfuscated
components are represented by the CNF formula using the circuit constructs of
Figs. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Those three constructs are encoded into the CNF in the same
way as the other nodes and gates. The variables in the CNF model also include
programming vector, circuit inputs, and circuit outputs. The known input-output
pairs are applied by using unit clauses to force an input or an output variable to be
certain value. To avoid confusion with arbitrary input and output vectors (I and O
respectively), an input-output pairing that is known to be correct as is denoted Î and
Ô with various subscripts.
4.3 Incremental-SAT Algorithm
Our oracle-guided incremental-SAT based algorithm is given in Alg. 1. Following
the notation described at the start of this section, the algorithm uses the sub-formula
M(I, P, P ′) to check whether two programming vectors induce different logic functions,
and uses feas(P ) and feas(P ′) to constrain programming vector assignments to
be consistent with all previously observed input-output pairs from the oracle. In
Alg. 1, both feas(P ) and feas(P ′) are typically initialized to > meaning that the
programming vectors are initially unconstrained; however, when using the modeling
construct in Fig. 3.1a where only the 00,01, and 10 values are used for each pair of
programming bits to select one of three logic functions, the constraints are initialized
to rule out the 11 assignment.
The feasibility constraints are increasingly strengthened as the algorithm iterates
through the loop. At the jth loop iteration in Alg. 1, a satisfying assignment at line 6
produces an input vector I that can distinguish two feasible programming vectors
P and P ′. This vector I is assigned to Îj and the oracle is queried to obtain the
corresponding output Ôj. The pair (Îj, Ôj) is known to be a correct input-output
pairing according to the oracle, and it is used to strengthen the programming vector
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feasibility constraints at lines 9 and 10. To strengthen the constraints on P , a new
copy of the circuit CNF formula is added with P as its programming vector and
Îj and Ôj applied to inputs and outputs as unit clauses (line 9). The feasibility
constraint on P ′ is strengthened in the same way (line 10). The strengthening of the
feasibility constraints corresponds to adding new shaded blocks in Fig. 4.1. Note that
the strengthened feasibility constraints will necessarily have fewer solutions after being
strengthened; specifically, among the values P and P ′ that satisfied the SAT formula
at line 6, at least one will now be infeasible1.
Once the feasibility constraints are sufficiently strong, there will no longer exist two
different programming vectors that induce distinct logic functions while also satisfying
the feasibility constraints. At this point, the SAT call at line 6 becomes unsatisfiable,
and a final SAT call is made (line 12) to find a single programming vector P that
satisfies the feasibility constraints. Note that the value of P that is discovered may
not be a unique solution, but it is known that no other feasible P ′ induces a different
overall logic function2, as this is necessary for the SAT call at line 6 to be unsatisfiable.
Relative to SAT-based attacks of El Massad et al. [24] and Subramanyan et al. [29],
a distinguishing feature of our work is the use of incremental SAT. A typical SAT
problem is encoded in CNF and solved by a SAT solver to output either a satisfying
assignment or a result of UNSAT to indicate that no such assignment exists. In the
process of solving the SAT problem instance, the solver spends considerable time
learning from conflicts and making inferences to simplify the problem and guide its
search toward a satisfying assignment. If solving a set of related SAT instances, it is
desirable to reuse this reasoning to reduce the number of costly inferences made in
1Because P and P ′ induce different outputs under the input vector Îj , no more than one of them
can induce output vector Ôj , which is now known to be correct.
2If two programming vectors do not produce different outputs for any input vectors, then they
induce the same logic function
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each SAT call [8]; incremental SAT is the formulation that allows for efficient reuse
of inference across related SAT instances. Our problem is amenable to solving by
incremental SAT because each SAT query (line 6 of Alg. 1) is solving an instance
obtained by adding clauses (at lines 9 and 10) to the previously-solved SAT problem
instance. All inferences learned in one SAT problem are therefore still applicable in
the subsequent one.
A number of engineering challenges are addressed in order to use an oracle-guided
approach with incremental SAT solving. An overview is given here, with more
information found in the user manual included with our program. The algorithm
is implemented using a modified version of MiniSat [9] version 2.2.0. From within
MiniSat, at each iteration of the algorithm, when a satisfying assignment to the CNF is
produced (at line 6 of Alg. 1), the primary input values (Îj) are extracted and mapped
into their corresponding signal names and printed to a file. The oracle, implemented
as a standalone executable, is then queried (line 8) and the program waits for the
oracle to map Îj to Ôj. Once the oracle has produced Ôj, the program adds new
clauses to the ongoing CNF problem in order to strengthen the constraints on P and
P ′.
The MiniSat 2.2.0 (simp) version is used because it implements variable elimination
and simplification before solving. The overhead cost of performing the simplifications
is justified because the simplified constraints are carried forward and used in all future
iterations. Because this version of MiniSat can eliminate variables, care must be taken
to “freeze” certain variables so that they will not be eliminated. In our case, the
programming vectors P and P ′, and the input vector I, are frozen. Being frozen means
that variables will always remain in the SAT problem, and this makes it possible to
read out their values whenever a satisfying assignment is found.
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Figure 4.2: Gate-level netlist of circuit c17.
4.4 Baseline SAT-based De-obfuscation Algorithm
The baseline I used in my work is the approach that introduced by El Massad,
Garg, and Tripunitara [24], which is similar to mine. Their algorithm can de-obfuscate
a circuit in minutes while using brute force can take years [27]. Except for attacking
different circuits, the major difference between my work and theirs is that I use
incremental SAT to increase the performance. Unlike incremental SAT, the baseline
treats each iteration as an unrelated SAT problem, so the solved variables and clauses
in the previous iteration cannot be re-used in the current iteration. T runtime of the
incremental approach is compared to the baseline in Chapter 5.
4.5 Illustrative
In this section, I use ISCAS-85 benchmark circuit c17 to demonstrate algorithm 1.
The techniques shown here are NAND/NOR/XOR Camouflaged Standard Cells and
fully camouflaged logic gates. In addition, I give an example to show why a successfully
solved function does not agree with the oracle circuit gate-by-gate. Figure 4.2 is the
gate level netlist for c17.
4.5.1 Example 1 - NAND/NOR/XOR Camouflaging
Figure 4.3 shows the camouflaged c17 model. I camouflage gate G1, G4, and
G5. The camouflaged gate is equivalent to Figure 3.1(a). The program will find a
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j
num. feasible SAT solution (Alg. 1, line 6) constraint learned
CNF statistics
Incremental
CNF statistics
Baseline
configurations {I} {P} {P ′} (Îj, Ôj) num. vars num. clauses num. vars num. clauses
1 27 01000 10,01,00 00,10,00 (01000,11) 114 364 114 364
2 14 10100 00,10,01 00,01,01 (00000,00) 170 640 239 739
3 8 10110 00,00,01 00,01,01 (10110,10) 236 916 364 1114
4 6 00100 10,01,01 00,01,01 (00100,00) 294 790 489 1489
5 4 00000 01,01,01 00,01,01 (00000,00) 344 1066 614 1864
6 2 11101 01,01,01 01,01,00 (11101,11) 333 1342 739 2239
7 1 UNSAT - 95 1614 864 2614
Table 4.1: Values produced at each iteration of Alg. 1 during deobfuscation of the camouflaged c17
circuit in Figure 4.3. The number of feasible configurations is the number of programming vectors
that satisfy the constraints at each iteration of the algorithm.
programming vector P that can configure the camouflaged model to be functionally
equivalent to the oracle. Because there are only three choices of function for to each
camouflaged cell, two bits of the programming vector are used to represent a gate.
The value of 00 selects a XOR gate, 01 selects a NAND gate, and 10 selects a NOR
gate. The value of 11 is forbidden here by a constraint.
Table 4.1 recorded step-by-step results. In the table, j is the iteration number; I, P ,
P ′ are the assigned values in the solution to the SAT call at line 6 of the algorithm; (Iˆj ,
Oˆj) are the input-output pairs obtained and used to strengthen feasibility constraints
at lines 9 and 10 of the algorithm. For instance, the input value I = 01000 is found
in the first iteration. Applying this input to the oracle produces an input-output
pair (01000,11). In the next iteration, there are only 14 feasible configurations can
satisfy this pair. Program then generates a different output when applying another
input, which is the value of 10100. After six iterations, the program can not find such
two different control vectors that can satisfy the previously found input-output pairs.
At this time, the feasibility constraints imposed by these six pairs are sufficient to
identify a unique logic function that matches the oracle and thus de-obfuscates the
circuit. There is only one configuration remaining after 6 iterations. However, there
can be more than one feasible configuration in the last step for some larger circuits.
In Table 4.1, the number of clauses and unresolved variables is growing sub-linearly
at each iteration for the incremental solver. This indicates that the solver is making
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simplifications to the problem as it runs, which is important for large camouflaged
designs.
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Figure 4.3: Modeling of c17 benchmark with G1, G4, G5 camouflaged using NAND/NOR/XOR
camouflaging.
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Figure 4.4: Modeling of c17 with all gates fully camouflaged. In this scenario, the reverse engineer
only knows the routing.
4.5.2 Example 2 - All Gates are Camouflaged
In this scenario, all the logic gates in circuit c17 are fully camouflaged, the only
information left is the routing. The model is shown in Fig. 4.4 which is based on
c17, and the solution is shown in Fig. 4.5. Though different from the oracle on a
gate-by-gate basis, the resolved function is equivalent to the original. Solving a circuit
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with all gates are camouflaged is very hard, the program cannot de-obfuscate c432
after three days when all 160 gates are camouflaged.3
G1’
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G3’
G4’
G5’
G6’
i1
i2
i3
i4
o1
o0
i0
Figure 4.5: Resolved function of c17 when all gates are fully camouflaged.
3The ISCAS-85 benchmark c432 has 160 gates, some of which have more than 2 inputs. Because
I use 2-input obfuscated gates, I map c432 into a circuit with 209 gates of 2 or fewer inputs, and
then obfuscate all 209 cells of the remapped circuit.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND USER GUIDE
5.1 Introduction to Software
5.1.1 Purpose
The Oracle-Guided Incremental SAT Solver (Solver) is designed to solve camouflaged
circuit with extremely high efficiency. The camouflaged circuit model represents
the reverse engineer’s uncertainty about the logic gates. The oracle represents the
real physical object, where the user has only the ability to apply inputs and observe
outputs, but cannot look inside to see what the gates are. The Solver will use the
oracle as guide to solve for the logic function of the camouflaged circuit.
5.1.2 Principle
Solver executes a loop that continually finds new input and output vectors using
SAT queries and an oracle circuit model. After some number of iterations, the
constraints accumulated are sufficient to rule out all logical functions except for the
one that is the true function of the obfuscated circuit.
5.1.3 Terminology
The additional terminology used in this chapter is listed below:
• Oracle program: an executable program that can produce the correct circuit
output for any input. The input is provided to it via file PI.txt, and the
corresponding output is written to PO.txt.
• Camouflaged circuit: obfuscated oracle circuit.
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• Allowed values: Allowed values are the sets of values that the programming bits
for each obfuscated component can take. Given that the programming bits select
the functionality of the circuit, the combinations of the allowed values for all
components represents the space of hypotheses for the overall circuit function.
Finding specific values from these choices is the deobfuscation problem, and is
the goal of our program.
5.2 Installation Tutorial
5.2.1 Dependencies
NOTE: The Solver is based on MINISAT.
• MINISAT module: modified from original MINISAT
– (MROOT)/core: includes MINISAT solver head file, implementation file
and related supporting file.
– (MROOT)/mtl: includes MINISAT templates and make file.
– (MROOT)/utils: includes MINISAT utilities.
• Solver module: solver module
– (MROOT)/simp: includes Solver main file and MINISAT SimpSolver
source file.
– (MROOT)/incre: includes Solver source file and all the related utilities.
– (MROOT)/Oracle: includes sample Oracle and sample Shell script.
5.2.2 Installation
Makefile is included in (MROOT)/simp directory, change to MROOT directory
and use command below to install
1. $ export MROOT=(solver-dir)
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2. $ cd simp
3. $ make rs
4. $ cp SOLVER static (install-dir)/SOLVER
NOTE:
1. The minimum requirement for complier is g++ 4.9.
2. If make fails, use $ make clean and try again.
5.2.3 Command Line Usage
After installation, solver can be accessed from command line:
$ SOLVER [options] <Cam.v > <Orac.sh >
• Cam.v : the Verilog netlist of the circuit to be de-obfuscated. The netlist must
have the necessary annotations for the PIs and annotations to define the allowed
values for the programming bits. Note that only a restricted subset of Verilog
can be used, as defined below.
• Orac.sh: shell script that the solver will execute to query Oracle.
• -d, - -debug: change to debug mode, solver will generate log message and log
files.
• -o, - -outfile: export solution to this file .
For example, if the oracle shell is ”c432-Oracle.sh” and the camouflaged model is
”c432-mux4-101.v”, then the command can be:
$ SOLVER -d - -outfile Solution.txt c432-mux4-101.v c432-Oracle.sh
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5.2.4 Description of oracle program
During the solving, Solver will repeatedly query the oracle by generating a ’PI.txt’
file and reading a ’PO.txt’ file. For stability sake, these filenames can not be changed.
Please make sure your oracle program will can read ’PI.txt’ and export ’PO.txt’ in
working directory. Sample PO.txt is in folder Oracle. The first line are the signal
names, and the second line are the signal values. Each net name or value in PO file is
seperated by a tab, each line in PO file is seperated by a line break. PI file uses the
same format. For example:
N1(\t)N2(\t)N3(\t)N4(\t)N5(\t)CONST1(\t)CONST0(\n)
1(\t)1(\t)1(\t)0(\t)1(\t)1(\t)0(\n)
The user’s oracle program can produce the outputs by any means they desire. In
a reverse engineering setting, the oracle program could be a script that physically
queries the obfuscated circuit via its scan chain. For sake of evaluation, users may
wish to implement an oracle program that run simulation of a non-obfuscated circuit
function, or queries a pre-programmed exhaustive look-up table of PI-PO pairs. In
the example oracle program we provide, the PIs are mapped to POs by evaluating the
circuit CNF using Minisat with appropriate inputs applied.
5.2.5 Format of camouflage circuit model
The camouflaged circuit model, including all programming bits is written in a
limited subset of gate-level Verilog, the following is an example:
module c17 (N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,N10,N11,CONST1,CONST0,D 0,D 1,D 2,D 3);
input N1,N2,N3,N4,N5,CONST1,CONST0 ;//RE PI;
input D 0,D 1 ;//RE ALLOW(00,01,10,11);
input D 2,D 3 ;//RE ALLOW(00,01,10,11);
output N10,N11;
wire N6,N7,N8,N9,D 0 NOT,D 1 NOT,N7 NOT,N7 OBF,ED 0,ED 1,ED 2,ED 3,ED 4,
ED 5,ED 6,ED 7,ED 8,ED 9,D 2 NOT,D 3 NOT,N6 NOT,N6 OBF,ED 10,ED 11,
ED 12,ED 13,ED 14,ED 15,ED 16,ED 17,ED 18,ED 19;
nand2 gate1( .a(N1), .b(N3), .O(N6) );
nand2 gate2( .a(N3), .b(N4), .O(N8) );
nand2 gate3( .a(N2), .b(N8), .O(N7) );
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nand2 gate4( .a(N8), .b(N5), .O(N9) );
nand2 gate5( .a(N6 OBF), .b(N7), .O(N10) );
nand2 gate6( .a(N7 OBF), .b(N9), .O(N11) );
inv1 gate7( .a(D 0), .O(D 0 NOT) );
inv1 gate8( .a(D 1), .O(D 1 NOT) );
inv1 gate9( .a(N7), .O(N7 NOT) );
and2 gate10( .a(N7), .b(D 0 NOT), .O(ED 0) );
and2 gate11( .a(N7 NOT), .b(D 0 NOT), .O(ED 1) );
and2 gate12( .a(CONST1), .b(D 0), .O(ED 2) );
and2 gate13( .a(CONST0), .b(D 0), .O(ED 3) );
and2 gate14( .a(ED 0), .b(D 1 NOT), .O(ED 9) );
and2 gate15( .a(ED 1), .b(D 1), .O(ED 7) );
and2 gate16( .a(ED 2), .b(D 1 NOT), .O(ED 5) );
and2 gate17( .a(ED 3), .b(D 1), .O(ED 4) );
or2 gate18( .a(ED 4), .b(ED 5), .O(ED 6) );
or2 gate19( .a(ED 6), .b(ED 7), .O(ED 8) );
or2 gate20( .a(ED 9), .b(ED 8), .O(N7 OBF) );
inv1 gate21( .a(D 2), .O(D 2 NOT) );
inv1 gate22( .a(D 3), .O(D 3 NOT) );
inv1 gate23( .a(N6), .O(N6 NOT) );
and2 gate24( .a(N6), .b(D 2 NOT), .O(ED 10) );
and2 gate25( .a(N6 NOT), .b(D 2 NOT), .O(ED 11) );
and2 gate26( .a(CONST1), .b(D 2), .O(ED 12) );
and2 gate27( .a(CONST0), .b(D 2), .O(ED 13) );
and2 gate28( .a(ED 10), .b(D 3 NOT), .O(ED 19) );
and2 gate29( .a(ED 11), .b(D 3), .O(ED 17) );
and2 gate30( .a(ED 12), .b(D 3 NOT), .O(ED 15) );
and2 gate31( .a(ED 13), .b(D 3), .O(ED 14) );
or2 gate32( .a(ED 14), .b(ED 15), .O(ED 16) );
or2 gate33( .a(ED 16), .b(ED 17), .O(ED 18) );
or2 gate34( .a(ED 19), .b(ED 18), .O(N6 OBF) );
endmodule
There are several points that need attention regarding the Verilog netlist:
• The line declaring primary inputs should be followed by ”//RE PI;”.
• The line declaring control bits should be noted by ”//RE ALLOW();”.
• Allowed values for each group of control bits should be written inside parentheses
of ”//RE ALLOW();”, for example ”//RE ALLOW(1,0);”. If one camouflaged
gate requires more than one control bits, for example it needs two bits, use the
format ”//RE ALLOW(00,01,10,11);”.
• The number of control bits in an input line must be equal to the length of
allowed values after it. For example, ”input D 1; //RE ALLOW(00,01,10,11);”
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is illegal because it defines a single programming bit but describes a set of 2-bit
values for the bit to take.
• Primary inputs named CONST1 and CONST0 will be interpreted as values 1
and 0.
• Solver can accept the following gate types:
– inv
– and (with any number of fanin)
– or (with any number of fanin)
– xor
– nor (with any number of fanin)
– nand (with any number of fanin)
– buf
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5.2.6 Flow Diagram
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NOTE: The white filled blocks are solver tasks. And the red filled block belongs to
user defined oracle.
5.3 Architecture and implementation details
The real computation is based on encoded-CNF. So principle of the software is
very close to a compiler. The front end involves syntax analyzer and symbol table,
and back end is responsible for generating intermediate representation, which is the
encoded-CNF model. Different from the traditional concept of compiler, my software
doesn’t include code optimization and code generation module. It calls MINISAT’s
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interface to convert the Tseitin-encoded CNF model into the internal data structure
and solve. The communication between MINISAT and compiler happens in each
iteration.The compiler provides new encoded-CNF clauses for the circuit, and MINSAT
provide the intermediate result indicating whether the problem is solved. In this
section, the architecture, class structure, class interface and implementation, and the
verification tool are explained.
5.3.1 Control Flow
Based on the flow diagram provided in the previous section, the main function is
written as shown:
MiterSolver ∗MTR = new MiterSolver;
MTR−>buildmiter();
delete MTR;
while(1)
{
AddonSolver ∗ADD = new AddonSolver;
ADD−>start solving();
if(IncreSolver::check ret() == l True)
{
ADD−>queryOrac();
ADD−>continue solving();
}
else
{
break;
}
delete ADD;
}
SoluFinder ∗finder = new SoluFinder;
finder−>find solu();
IncreSolver::print state();
finder−>print solution();
delete finder;
return 0;
There are some challenges needed to solve when writing this program.
1. Working as an API, this software must be encapsulated and extensible.
30
Figure 5.1: class structure of the software.
2. Considering that some large design require many iteration before completing,
memory usage is critical, so this software is running iteratively rather than
recursively. However, the intermediate result will be removed after each iteration.
3. For the convenience of debugging, the status while running should be accessible
for inspection.
5.3.2 Class Structure
To deal with the first challenge, this software is wrapped by base class IncreSolver.
The class structure is shown in Fig. 5.1.?
The class MiterSolver works as the compiler, its responsibility is to translate the
input Verilog code into Tseitin encoded-CNF model. It also duplicates two copies
of the camouflaged circuit and builds the miter, which is the line 1, 2, 3 in Alg. 1.
Class AddonSolver solves the grown CNF model and applies the most recent input
to the oracle in order to get the corresponding output. The last step belongs to class
SoluF inder, it duplicates the camouflaged circuit CNF as the number of input-output
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pair, uses MINISAT’s interface to solve and collects the solution to the programming
vector that de-obfuscates the circuit.
To prevent the intermediate result from being deleted, all the necessary internal
variables and data structure are stored as static. So even though the instance of
AddonSolver is deleted, the intermediate data and the grown CNF model can be kept.
And the static variables can also be accessed from the base class regardless of whether
there is an instance of IncreSolver. But using static variables requires there should
be only one instance of class. By disabling the copy constructor, this software is a
typical singleton design.
5.3.3 IncreSolver
As the base class, the role of IncreSolver is mainly to declare and defines global
member variables and virtual functions. However, this class also provides some
common utilities. The global variables are declared as below, with description of each
one gives in comments:
public:
static Minisat::lbool ret; //
indicator: indicate whether this iteration in addon is sat or
not
std::map<int, std::string> Solution; //
container: store final Solution
std::map<int, std::string> PItemp; //
container: store temporary (only in this iteration) miter PI
index−>value
std::map<int, std::string> POtemp; //
container: store temporary (only in this iteration) oracle PO
index−>value
static std::vector<std::map<int, std::string> > OracPIs; //
container: store all temp PIs
static std::vector<std::map<int, std::string> > OracPOs; //
container: store all temp POs
IncreSolver();
˜IncreSolver();
static Minisat::lbool check ret(); // tools
: check ret before any instanization
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static void print state(); // tools
: print info including CPU, memory, time ,iterations
protected:
static bool debug; // indicator: level of
verb
static bool out file; // indicator: exist
solution file or not
static bool time limit; // indicator: set time
limited or not
static int niter; // indicator: number of
iterations
static int time bound; // value: time limited
static const char ∗ Came file path; // path: input
Camouflage file path
static const char ∗ Orac file path; // path: input Oracle
SHELL file path
static const char ∗ target cnf; // path: output of
buildmiter, input of solver, and output of addon
static const char ∗ Solver solution; // path: final solution
path
static std::vector<int> camPIndex; // container:
miter first circuit’s PI, and also it the oracle’s PI
static std::vector<int> camPOindex; // container: PO
index list
static std::vector<int> camCBindex; // container: CB
except duplicated circuit
static std::vector<int> miterCBindex; // container: CB
include duplicated circuit
static std::vector<int> camCB2index; // container:
duplication’s CB
static std::vector<int> nodes2grab; // container:
variable need to be frozen during incremental solving
static std::map<int, std::string> indexVarDict; // map: store
map of index to netname
static std::map<std::string, int> varIndexDict; // map: store
map of netname to index
std::map<int, std::string> CB1temp; // map: store
temporary (only in this iteration) original CB index−>value
std::map<int, std::string> CB2temp; // map: store
temporary (only in this iteration) duplication CB index−>value
std::vector<int> addon CB1; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) first duplication CB index
std::vector<int> addon CB2; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) second duplication CB index
std::vector<int> addon PI1; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) first duplication CB index
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std::vector<int> addon PI2; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) second duplication PI index
std::vector<int> addon PO1; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) first duplication PO index
std::vector<int> addon PO2; // container: store
temporary (only in this iteration) second duplication PO index
static int cktTotVarNum; // values: number of
wire including miter and oracle circuit
static int camVarNum; // values: total number
of wires + inputs + CBs + outputs in the original cam ckt
static int miterOutIndex; // values: last index of
miter
static std::vector<std::string> camCNFile; // CNF: original
Camouflaged circuit CNF
static progress t bar; // indicator:
process bar
static Minisat::SimpSolver S; // object: used
for solve add on
static Minisat::SimpSolver S final; // object: used
for solve finalSolue
static clock t start; // indicator: starting
time
static clock t totoal all; // indicator: all thread
total time
static clock t total sub; // indicator: sub−thread
total time
5.3.4 MiterSolver
Class MiterSolver is responsible for parsing the input netlist and building the
miter. The complete class definition is shown as below:
class MiterSolver : public IncreSolver
{
private:
MiterSolver(MiterSolver&);
int baseMtrVarNum; // values: total variable number (original
+ duplicated + XOR + OR)
std::vector<std::string> baseCnfMtrLs; // CNF: completed
miter (including original Cam, duplicated Cam, XOR, Or)
std::vector<std::vector<int> > inputs; // container: same
to inputs (includes PI and CBs)
std::vector<std::string> forbidden string; // CNF: forbidden
string
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public:
MiterSolver(); // constructor: initialize base class and
milterSolver
˜MiterSolver(); // deconstructor
void buildmiter(); // main: build CNF formatted miter and
export to Miter file path
private:
void genOracCNF(char const ∗ OracPath, int start); // main:
parse "OracPath", generate CNF, index start on "start"
void genCameCNF(char const ∗ CamePath); // main: parse
"CamePath" and generate CNF
std::vector<std::string> forbidden bits(std::string line, std::
vector<int> target); // main: process forbidden options
std::vector<std::string> connectPO xor(std::vector<int> &posIndex,
int &camVarNum, int &xorInt); // tools: connect POs using
xor, used only for two duplicated circuit
void formatCheck(std::vector<std::string> netlist);
};
Note that as a singleton design, the copy constructor is disabled. Except for the
copy control functions, the only public member function is buildmiter(). This function
is the flow control function is this class, which can be described as Fig. 5.2. The
function forbidden bits is responsible for the conversion from allowed bits to forbidden
bits. The allowed bits defined in input Verilog will be translated in this function and
added to the CNF model as constrain to prevent any non-allowed values from being
assigned to those programming bits.
5.3.5 AddonSolver
Class AddonSolver is the most important part. Its job can be roughly divided
into three parts:
1. solve CNF model generated by MiterSolver or the previous iteration.
2. apply input to the oracle and generate the corresponding output.
3. strengthen the current model by adding constraints for the new input-output
vector
The detailed work flow is described in Fig. 5.3. And the complete class definition
is shown below:
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Figure 5.2: class MiterSolver’s work flow
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Figure 5.3: class AddonSolver’s work flow
37
class AddonSolver: public IncreSolver
{
public:
AddonSolver();
˜AddonSolver();
void start solving();
void continue solving();
void queryOrac();
private:
void print solution(const char ∗ path);
void freeze();
void print map(std::map<int,std::string> &container, std::ofstream &
outfile);
void solve();
void export PI();
void parse PO();
void run shell();
};
The function run shell() is the implementation of querying oracle. It based on C
standard library function system(char* command). By calling this function, the
current process is forked into two identical processes. One of the process calls the
argument command, while the other process is stalled until the previous process sends
a exit signal. The string command is a shell command.
Function continue solving() is designed to collect output generated from oracle
and add more constraints to the current model. To be specific, it duplicates two more
encoded camouflaged circuit copies and connects the control bits to the original two
copies respectively, then the newly found input-output pair is assigned to both of
them as constraints.
Due to the incremental solving, some unnecessary variables will be eliminated.
However, some important variables, such as control bits, input bits and output bits,
can also be deleted. So I write function freeze() to notify the SAT solver of which
variables should be frozen.
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5.3.6 SoluFinder
As the last class, SoluF inder is responsible to use all the collected input-output
pairs to create a CNF model, then solve it and translate the solution into human
readable form. The form indicates the value of the programming bits, which can in
turn specify the actual functionality of the camouflaged gates. The work flow can
be summarized as Fig. 5.4 and the class definition is shown below. Similar to class
AddonSolver, the function freeze() can freeze those critical variables and prevent
them from be eliminated by solver.
class SoluFinder : public IncreSolver
{
public:
SoluFinder();
˜SoluFinder();
void find solu();
void print solution();
private:
int num2dup = 0;
int totVarNum = 0;
int clauseNum = 0;
std::vector<std::string> finalCNF;
void solve it();
void freeze();
};
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Figure 5.4: class SoluFinder’s work flow
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION OF DE-OBFUSCATION ALGORITHM
I evaluate my algorithm using a set of ISCAS-85 combinational benchmarks [11].
I also investigate the way to utilize both functionality and connection obfuscation.
The results presented in this chapter are based on the attacker model introduced in
chapter 3.
6.1 Evaluation of Camouflaging Techniques
I apply my incremental deobfuscation algorithm to reverse engineer designs cam-
ouflaged using Camouflaged Standard Cells [27], Obfusgates [23], and Transformable
Interconnects [4]. I implement each of the three camouflaging techniques randomly as
summarized in Tab. 6.1 and described here:
• For Camouflaged Standard Cells, I randomly choose gates from NAND2, NOR2,
and XOR2 to camouflage. Those gates are the types that can be realized by
camouflaged standard cells.
• For Obfusgates, although each NAND4 obfusgate can implement 162 different
logical functions, most of the functions do not exist in the ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
The gates from the ISCAS benchmarks that can be realized by the NAND4
obfusgates are as shown in Tab. 6.1.
• For Transformable Interconnects, I randomly select a wire to obfuscate and
choose three wires driven by other gates’ output as the input to the logic model.
But before this, I levelize circuit based on dependency, and all the PI are assigned
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Figure 6.1: Plots show average runtime to de-obfuscate eight ISCAS-85 benchmarks with varied
numbers of randomly obfuscated components using the camouflaging techniques presented in Cam-
ouflaged Standard Cells[27], Obfusgates[23] and Transformable Interconnects[4]. Specifically, the
runtimes shown are the average runtimes over 10 random trials for each technique and number of
obfuscated components.
as level 1. For example. a gate has inputs from PI and another gate at level
2, then this gate is in level 3. Note an attacker may be able to identify a loop
and know it is dummy wire, so I only use dummy wire from the levels close to
primary input.
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I apply all three techniques to the eight ISCAS benchmarks, as shown in Fig. 6.1.
In each case, I vary the number of components that are obfuscated, and for each
number of obfuscated components, I repeat the experiment 10 times making different
random choices of which components to obfuscate, and plot the average runtime.
To provide a common framework for comparison, I plot the de-obfuscation runtime
against the number of possible configurations in Fig. 6.1. The number of possible
configurations is 2x where x is the number of programming bits needed to select the
functionality of the circuit. The value of x also indicates the number of camouflaged
cells in the circuits. Specifically, in Fig. 6.1, the numbers of camouflaged cells for
Camouflaged Standard Cells [27], Obfusgates [23], and Transformable Interconnects
[4] are x/2, x/5, and x/2, respectively. Note that I don’t consider here that some
programming bits select the same logic function.
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Figure 6.2: Eliminating feasible configurations using input-output examples generated by the de-
obfuscation algorithm for circuits c2670, c3540, c5315, and c7552 with 51 gates camouflaged using
camouflaged standard cells that can implement NAND, NOR or XOR gates. The initial model of
each camouflaged circuit has 351 configurations. The five trials in each plot denote five different
random choices of which gates to camouflage.
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Camoflaging Technique
Camouflagable components
in ISCAS-85 benchmarks
NAND/NOR/XOR camouflaged cells [27] NAND2, NOR2, XOR2
NAND4 Obfusgates [23]
AND/NAND(2,3,4), INV,
OR/NOR(2,3,4), BUFFER
Tranformable Interconnects [4] any net
Table 6.1: Camouflagable components in the ISCAS-85 benchmarks when applying different camou-
flaging techniques. Note that, in the case of transformable interconnects, any net can be chosen, but
the choice of dummy connections is restricted to avoid creating apparent combinational loops.
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Figure 6.3: Comparing the total deobfuscation CPU time and the number of vectors used for
deobfuscation of Corruptibility-guided and random camouflaged ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
6.2 Limitation of SAT-based De-obfuscation
SAT has the limited performance to solve certain circuit, such as multipliers [7].
The effectiveness of SAT-based deobfuscation on such circuits is also limited. To
investigate this, I tested my algorithm on two multiplier. First, I use ten Camouflaged
Standard Cells to obfuscate c6288, and it takes 5.4 hours to get solved. Most of the
time is spent on the last iteration, which is the one SAT solver returns an UNSAT
result (at line 6 of Alg. 1). I also repeat the same experiments on a 16-bit Montgomery
multiplier [16] in field GF(216), and the program cannot finish solving in 6 hours with
only one gate camouflaged. The reason is that solving GF multiplier problems using
SAT is tough, which has been studied in [22]. So, including my work, any SAT-based
algorithm has limited ability to reverse engineer multipliers or cryptographic ciphers.
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This situation can be utilized by works that camouflaged circuits in a way that resists
SAT-based reverse engineering [38].
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Figure 6.4: Comparing the total de-obfuscation runtime of baseline and incremental algorithms
on 2400 randomly camouflaged circuits instances using different styles of camouflaged gates. The
incremental solver gives an average speedup of 10.5x. Runtimes exceeding 1500 seconds are truncated
from the plot.
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Figure 6.5: Examining the variable and clauses elimination using incremental SAT solving on 10
randomly camouflaged instances of ISCAS-85 benchmark c7552, each with 200 NAND/NOR/XOR
camouflaged standard cells [27].
6.3 Incremental Algorithm versus Baseline
In this section, I provide the comparison between my work and the result from
baseline, which is the algorithm from El Massad et al. [24]. Both of the programs can
solve any kind of camouflaging, but my comparison focuses on Camouflaged Standard
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Cells because it is used in El Massad’s work. Fig. 6.4 is the runtime by using baseline
and incremental algorithms to solve ISCAS-85 benchmarks with randomly selected
gates that use XOR/NOR/NAND and the cells from Fig. 3.1b. Each dot stands for
the runtime for my solver and the baseline. My solver can solve the largest example
faster than baseline, where the incremental solver gives more significant improvement.
To quantify the efficiency benefit from the incremental program, I here provide more
detail using the example that c7552 camouflaged with 200 Camouflaged Standard
Cells [27]. Fig. 6.5 shows the trend of the number of clauses and the number of
unsolved variables. Theoretically, a non-incremental solver doesn’t make any further
simplification. Thus both of the trends would appear linear as new copies of the
CNF-encoded circuit are added to the original problem in each iteration. Subfig. 6.5a
shows sub-linear growth in the number of clauses, and in Subfig. 6.5b, the number
of unsolved variables also grows slower than linear. This figure suggests that some
unnecessary variables and values are simplified.
6.4 Evaluating for combination of different camouflaging tech-
niques
The previous section demonstrated the performance of each technique. Camouflag-
ing a chip using Camouflaged Standard Cells [5] can provide functionality obfuscation,
using Transformable Interconnection [4] can provide connection obfuscation, and using
Obfusgates [23] can provide both functionality and connection obfuscation. However,
the overall performance about combining different technique might be different. To
investigate in which ratio combining the both functionality and connection obfuscation
can provide the best security, I applied NOR/NAND/XOR Camouflaged Standard
Cell (Fig.3.1(a)) and Transformable Interconnect (Fig. 3.3) to ISCAS-85 benchmarks
as described here:
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1. First, I apply NOR/NAND/XOR Camouflaged Standard Cell (Fig.3.1(a)) to
replace the original gate to camouflage a circuit. I select gates to obfuscate by
randomly.
2. Then I apply Transformable Interconnect (Fig.3.3). Similar to the previous
section, I randomly choose nets to camouflage and then attach three dummy
wires from the previous level to the 4-to-1 multiplexer. The four nets can be
from the original circuits or the nets from Camouflaged Standard Cells.
3. Each Camouflage Standard Cell can provide three possibilities of the circuit,
and each Transformable Interconnect can provide four possibilities to the circuit.
4. Except for c499, the number of camouflaged gates are 200. C499 does not have
200 gates, so I use 100 instead.
The result is shown in Fig. 6.6. Different from my expectation, there is not such
a best ratio. Each benchmark favors to one single type of obfuscation rather than a
combination. However, different circuit tends to various techniques. According to the
result, obfuscation via functionality and connection may have similar effects on c1355.
Functionality obfuscation appears to provide better security for c499 and c880, which
are relatively smaller benchmarks. Moreover, connection obfuscation appears to work
better in the other larger designs.
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Figure 6.6: Plots show each design favors to a certain type of obfuscation. Smaller circuit tends to
functionality obfuscation, while connection obfuscation works better with larger circuit.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This work proposes an incremental-SAT based approach for de-obfuscating camou-
flaged circuits. I have implemented the algorithm and tested its performance by using
it to de-obfuscate ISCAS-85 combinational benchmarks when camouflaged using three
different styles of component camouflaging. The results show that the algorithm is
able to efficiently deobfuscate the ISCAS-85 benchmarks regardless of camouflaging
style, and is able to do so 10.5x faster than the best existing approaches. Our tool is
released publicly to evaluate and support development of future selective component
camouflaging approaches. [21] [40] [39]
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